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Traveling Through the Jungle of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Internet Age
Scott Brinkerhoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
When does a search in cyberspace establish personal jurisdiction in
court? Although personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has remained virtually
static over the last decade, dynamic technological developments over the
same time period have stretched long-arm statutes, subjecting potential non-
resident defendants to personal jurisdiction in foreign lands. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals ("the court") was asked recently to extend its jurisdictional
arm when it considered whether data-mining activities performed by a for-
eign travel reservation website operator, TravelJungle, over the Internet of
Texas-based American Airlines' ("American's") website established mini-
mum contacts with the State of Texas so as to confer personal jurisdiction
over TravelJungle upon the trial court.' TravelJungle filed an interlocutory
appeal after the trial court denied TravelJungle's special appearance chal-
lenging the trial court's personal jurisdiction.2 The court affirmed the trial
court's order denying TravelJungle's special appearance because, among
other reasons, TravelJungle did not meet its burden of negating evidence
showing that it purposefully directed its data-gathering activity toward Amer-
ican's website ("AA.com") servers. 3 The court reasoned that since
TravelJungle deliberately directed activity towards AA.com, it should have
been aware of the possibility that it could be haled into any forum where
AA.com's servers were located.4 The court of appeals obviously had to grap-
ple with the scope of personal jurisdiction in a medium - cyberspace - where
physical contact, or even knowledge of the location of a particular forum
where contact allegedly occurred, is no longer necessary to form the basis of
a jurisdictional dispute. But was the court's jurisdictional approach to
TravelJungle correct? Perhaps even more importantly, did the court's ratio-
nale endanger the data-mining activities of general Internet search engines
like Google.com or, more specifically, successful domestic travel reservation
website operators such as Travelocity.com and Expedia.com?
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1. TravelJungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 212 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.).
2. Id. at 844.
3. Id. at 850.
4. Id. at 850-51.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
TravelJungle is registered as a limited liability company in the United
Kingdom, but its servers and employees are located in Germany and Bulgaria
- not in the United States. TravelJungle operates a website that uses special
software to gather airline flight and fare information from other websites.
The software then sorts the data and presents it on TravelJungle's website in
response to inquiries from consumers. When a consumer chooses to
purchase a flight presented on TravelJungle's website, a TravelJungle repre-
sentative in Bulgaria books the requested flight with the appropriate airline.
Between February 2003 and June 2004, TravelJungle included AA.com,
whose servers are located in Plano, Texas, in its data-mining activities and
listed AA.com, along with a copy of the airline's logo, on its website as one
of the airlines it searched to provide the requested travel data. On June 14,
2004, AA.com received 2,972 fare search requests from an IP address regis-
tered to TravelJungle. TravelJungle admitted to making at least one Ameri-
can reservation for a Texas resident directly through AA.com and at least
eight American reservations for Texas residents though other websites.
American sued TravelJungle in the 96th District Court of Tarrant
County, alleging multiple causes of action: breach of AA.com's Use Agree-
ment, which prohibits the use of information on the website for "commer-
cial" purposes; tortious interference with contracts American had entered into
with authorized Internet distributors of AA.com's travel data; tortious inter-
ference with prospective business relations; trespass of AA.com's servers;
civil conspiracy; common law trademark infringement; misappropriation;5
violation of the Texas computer crimes statute;6 and violation of the Texas
anti-dilution act. 7 In connection with American's allegation of tortious inter-
ference with prospective business relations, American claimed TravelJun-
gle's software did not always collect all of American's available fares,
including the lowest fares, from AA.com.8 Had users known that other fares
were available, American alleged, they might have purchased their fares di-
rectly at AA.com.9
In response to American's suit, TravelJungle entered a special appear-
ance challenging the trial court's personal jurisdiction over it.O Declining to
5. Id. at 844.
6. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(a) (Vernon 2003) (providing that "[a] person
commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer
network, or computer system without the effective consent of the owner.").
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002) (providing, in relevant
part, that "[a] person may bring an action to enjoin an act likely to injure a
business reputation or to dilute the distinctive quality of a mark ....
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issue findings of fact or conclusions of law, the trial court denied TravelJun-
gle's special appearance." The trial court determined that TravelJungle had
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Texas that would enable Texas
to assert personal jurisdiction over the company.12 TravelJungle filed an in-
terlocutory appeal from that ruling with the Fort Worth Court of Appeals.'3
I. FORT WORTH COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying TravelJun-
gle's special appearance and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings by holding that TravelJungle did not meet its burden of negating
evidence showing that it purposefully directed its data-gathering activity to-
ward AA.com's servers.14 The court's analysis focused on TravelJungle's
activity directed toward AA.com, not on TravelJungle's actual awareness of
the physical location of AA.com's servers.' 5 The court reasoned that
TravelJungle could not escape personal jurisdiction by purposefully engaging
in activity directed towards a server located in a particular forum and then
claiming ignorance of the location of that forum.16 Because TravelJungle
failed to negate all bases of jurisdiction alleged by American, the court ruled
that Texas could assert personal jurisdiction over TravelJungle.'7
A Texas court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant only if the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Texas Long-Arm Statute are satisfied.18 In BMC Software
Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, the Texas Supreme Court specifically stated that
"[t]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to
bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the [Texas] long-arm
statute."9 The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must negate all juris-
dictional bases when challenging a Texas court's personal jurisdiction.20 Al-
legations such as those made in TravelJungle (i.e., that a tort was committed
in Texas), satisfy the Texas Long-Arm Statute, but may not necessarily sat-
11. Id.
12. Id. at 843.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 851.
15. See id. at 850.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13
(1984). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006).
19. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002).
20. Id.
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isfy the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution.21 The require-
ments of due process are satisfied when: (1) the defendant establishes
minimum contacts with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.22 When
a plaintiff asserts that a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the minimum contacts analysis focuses on the relationships
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.23 A nonresident defen-
dant that purposefully avails itself of the privileges and benefits of con-
ducting business in a foreign jurisdiction has sufficient contacts with the
forum so as to confer personal jurisdiction on a court within that forum.24
Thus, where a defendant "deliberately engages in significant activities" in or
creates a "substantial connection" with the forum,25 he should "reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."26 In fact, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals has previously stated that "[a] defendant should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court where the effects of its conduct have been inten-
tionally caused through the purposeful direction of activity toward the forum
state, even if the defendant never physically enters the state."27 However, in
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdic-
tion over national borders, courts should accord significant weight to the
"unique burdens" placed upon an alien defendant called upon to defend a suit
in a foreign legal system.28
In its analysis of the instant case, the Second District of Forth Worth
paid particular attention to the deliberateness of TravelJungle's data-mining
activity directed toward AA.com. 29 For instance, the court noted that some-
one at TravelJungle had to purposefully put "AA.com" into a search script
before TravelJungle's software could be programmed to automatically gather
information from AA.com.30 By way of extension, the court highlighted how
TravelJungle's Internet searches differed from that of Google.com: whereas
Google.com's software collected data from the web at random, TravelJun-
21. See Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 788 (Tex.
2005).
22. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
23. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815
S.W.2d 223, 226-27 (Tex. 1991).
24. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985).
25. Id. at 475-76.
26. Id. at 474.
27. SITQ E.U., Inc. v. Reata Rests., Inc., It1 S.W.3d 638, 646 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.).
28. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
29. TravelJungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 212 S.W.3d 841, 847-51 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.).
30. Id. at 849.
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gle's software collected data from AA.com in connection with specific in-
quiries.3' The court also found persuasive an admission by one of
TravelJungle's minority shareholders, who said that when TravelJungle's
software accessed AA.com, "there might be a contact with the servers of
American Airlines."32 The court noted that such contact would occur in
Texas, the site of AA.com's servers. 33
In reaching its conclusion, the court dismissed TravelJungle's conten-
tion that it did not know where AA.com's servers were located.34 Instead,
the court analogized TravelJungle's activities to those of senders of spam e-
mail.35 The court looked to federal cases holding that senders of span e-
mails are subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum in which their e-mails
are received or where the server processing those e-mails is located.36 This
line of cases holds that by purposefully targeting e-mail addresses using a
particular server, the senders assumed the risk that they will be haled into a
forum where that server is located.37 These cases focus not on the defend-
ants' actual knowledge of the destination of their e-mail activity, but on the
deliberate nature of the defendants' activity.38 Thus, the TravelJungle court
held that "[b]y deliberately directing its activity toward AA.com, TravelJun-
gle should have been aware of the possibility that it would be haled into any
forum where AA.com's servers were located."39
IV. CRITIQUE
A. Two Approaches for Determining Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace
Surprisingly, this is not a case of first impression for the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals. In fact, the court declined to articulate an approach it had
employed just a few years earlier in Michel v. Rocket Engineering Corp.40
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 850-5 1.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. See, e.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616-
22 (E.D. Va.2002); Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778-
80 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
37. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 618; lnternet Doorway, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 778-79.
38. See, e.g., Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
39. TravelJungle, 212 S.W.3d at 851.
40. See Michel v. Rocket Eng'g Corp., 45 S.W.3d 658, 677-78 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2001, no pet.).
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1. The Sliding Scale Approach of Zippo Manufacturing Co.
In Michel, the court followed the narrow approach of Zippo Manufac-
turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. and characterized Internet use as falling
within three categories on a sliding scale for purposes of establishing the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised over a
defendant.41 At one end of the scale are "active" websites, which are used to
carry out business transactions (i.e., the seller electronically transmits the
product or services purchased and the buyer electronically transmits pay-
ment).42 Some courts have held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant is always proper when the defendant operates
an active website. 43 Conversely, some courts have held that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is never proper without
showing the defendant has done more than operate a "passive" website. 44 A
passive website does little more than make information available to users
who are interested in the passive website (e.g., an advertisement).45 In the
middle of the sliding scale are "interactive" websites, which allow for the
exchange of information between a website visitor and the website's sponsor,
but where business transactions are not necessarily consummated.46 Interac-
tive websites may or may not suffice for establishing personal jurisdiction,
depending upon the degree of interactivity between the parties on the web-
site.47 However, even courts that adhere to the sliding scale theory have not
found the degree of website interactivity determinative; rather, it is just one
factor to be considered in determining jurisdiction.48
Perhaps the TravelJungle court did not re-invoke the sliding scale theory
because TravelJungle's website, on its face, clearly qualified as an active
website: consumers electronically paid TravelJungle for providing the re-
quested fares, and TravelJungle electronically booked the requested fares for
consumers. On the other hand, maybe the court intentionally avoided using
the sliding scale analysis to signal its departure from an examination of the
degree of online interactivity and its return to a more traditional minimum
contacts analysis. Alternatively, the court may have simply considered
TravelJungle's purposeful direction of data-mining activity toward
AA.com's servers sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction without having
41. Id. at 677; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-27
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
42. Michel, 45 S.W.3d at 677.





48. See, e.g., ISI Brands, Inc. v. KCC Int'l, Inc. 458 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87-88
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
[Vol. XII
2008] Traveling Through the Jungle of Personal Jurisdiction 89
to resort to a sliding scale analysis of the website. Regardless of why the
court abandoned the sliding scale theory in this case, the court's holding cer-
tainly broadened the scope of personal jurisdiction arising out of Internet use.
2. The Traditional Approach of Inset Systems, Inc.
The U.S. District Court of Connecticut in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruc-
tions Set, Inc. offered a different approach when it employed a traditionally
broad personal jurisdiction analysis: it applied the state's long-arm statute; it
evaluated whether minimum contacts were established, focusing particularly
on the prongs of purposeful availment and reasonable anticipation; and it
assessed the reasonableness of its findings with respect to the burdens placed
upon the nonresident defendant.49 In this particular case, Inset Systems, a
Connecticut software developer, sued Instruction Set ("ISI"), a Massachu-
setts IT company that advertised via the Internet and a toll-free telephone
number, for trademark infringement.50 The district court specifically noted
that "ISI does not have any employees, nor offices in Connecticut, and it
does not conduct business in Connecticut on a regular basis."51 Nevertheless,
the court held that Connecticut's long-arm statute was applicable to ISI since
ISI had been:
continuously advertising over the Internet, which includes at least
10,000 access sites in Connecticut. Further, unlike hard-copy ad-
vertisements ... which are often quickly disposed of and reach a
limited number of potential consumers, Internet advertisements
are in electronic printed form so that they can be accessed again
and again by many more potential consumers. 52
The Inset court even went a step further, concluding that "advertising via the
Internet is solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy" Connecti-
cut's long-arm statute. 53
Additionally, in evaluating whether ISI's activities satisfied the require-
ments of minimum contacts, the court in Inset noted that, by definition, the
services offered by Internet advertising and toll-free telephone numbers are
not merely restricted to one state, but directed to all states. 54 Without issuing
findings regarding the number of Connecticut Internet users who actually
accessed ISI's website, the district court held that ISI had purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut by virtue
49. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (D. Conn.
1996).
50. Id. at 162-63.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 165.
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of the continuous availability of its advertising on the Internet.55 Further-
more, in assessing whether its exercise of jurisdiction over this nonresident
defendant was fair, the court in Inset declared that the distance between Con-
necticut and Massachusetts was "minimal."56 Since the dispute also involved
issues of Connecticut common and statutory law, the court emphasized Con-
necticut's interest in adjudicating the matter, which it could do "effi-
ciently."57 These findings were sufficient in the court's view to comport with
notions of fair play and substantial justice.58
In many respects, the court's holding in TravelJungle reflected the ratio-
nale employed by the District Court of Connecticut in Inset: an application of
the respective state's long-arm statute over the nonresident defendant and an
affirmative determination as to the satisfaction of the requirements of mini-
mum contacts. 59 However, the TravelJungle court declined to analyze
whether exercising jurisdiction over TravelJungle comported with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.60 Although the court mentioned
the second prong of the International Shoe test in its discussion of due pro-
cess, an analysis of the application of that test to the facts of the case is
conspicuously absent.61 This omission is puzzling not only because the court
disregards half of the basic personal jurisdiction test, but also because the
progenitor to the court's analysis, Inset, deemed it necessary to weigh the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a defendant who resided in a
neighboring state.62 In contrast, the parties in TravelJungle, like those in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, resided on nearly opposite sides
of the globe.63 In Asahi, the U.S. Supreme Court held that California's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over a Japanese-based defendant violated due
process. 64 In addition to placing significance on the international context of
the dispute, the Supreme Court noted the severe burden placed upon the de-





59. See TravelJungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 212 S.W.3d 841, 849, 851 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); cf. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163-65 (finding
proper an exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
60. See TravelJungle, 212 S.W.3d at 849-51; but cf. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163-65
(determining that exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
61. See TravelJungle, 212 S.W.3d at 846.
62. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
63. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1987); see
TravelJungle, 212 S.W.3d at 844.
64. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.
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headquarters and the California courts, but also to submit to a foreign na-
tion's judicial system. 65
The Asahi court then analyzed whether the interests of the plaintiff and
the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction outweigh the burdens placed upon
the defendant.66 The Court found that the plaintiffs claim for indemnifica-
tion, which arose from a transaction in Taiwan, were "slight."67 Addition-
ally, since the plaintiff was not a California resident, California's interest in
the dispute was "considerably diminished."68 Applying the Court's analysis
in Asahi to the TravelJungle case reveals the prudence of applying a reasona-
bleness test. TravelJungle undoubtedly involves an international context -
America and Europe. Although flying has become a more widespread mode
of transportation than when Asahi was decided twenty years ago, the burdens
placed upon TravelJungle to cross the Atlantic and submit to the courts of
Texas remain considerable. However, the interests of American in protecting
its property and those of Texas in protecting one of its key corporate re-
sidents are significant. In sum, the interests of American and Texas in adju-
dicating the matter in Texas courts probably outweigh the international
context and the burdens placed upon TravelJungle; however, at a minimum,
the matter deserves the courts' attention.
B. No Word from the Top
Perhaps the TravelJungle court's vacillating position with respect to the
application of a particular test results from the U.S. Supreme Court's dor-
mancy on the matter. True, the Supreme Court has recognized the Internet to
be "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communica-
tion."69 But despite the paradigm shift in fact patterns presented by the line
of Internet search engine and spam e-mail cases, the application of traditional
personal jurisdiction doctrine has remained relatively unscathed.70 This
should not be surprising. In 1980, for example, the progeny of International
Shoe withstood a similar challenge when the Supreme Court confronted the
possible expansion of personal jurisdiction resulting from "uniquely mobile"
automobiles.71 In considering the applicability of traditional personal juris-




69. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
70. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343,
1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating, "[wie do not believe that the advent of ad-
vanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and invio-
late principles of federal court jurisdiction.").
71. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 n. 11 (1980).
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diction doctrine to automobiles, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Due
Process Clause, by ensuring the orderly administration of the laws, gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."72
In the face of rapidly changing technology, it appears that one of the
Supreme Court's primary concerns rests with the predictability that this line
of jurisprudence affords potential defendants.73 Thus, the core analysis of an
Internet jurisdiction case - the minimum contacts test - should involve more
traditional factors, as suggested by the broad reasoning in TravelJungle.
C. Trouble Looming on the Internet Horizon?
If controversies arising out of a determination of Internet jurisdiction
apply the basic International Shoe tenets, how do the Internet's real
powerhouses, search engines such as Google, avoid crippling lawsuits from
all over the world forged in the name of minimum contacts? In its opinion,
the court in TravelJungle specifically referenced three separate instances of
testimony in which an expert witness for TravelJungle compared and differ-
entiated its own search functionality to that of Google.com.T4 One of
TravelJungle's shareholders, Dr. Hans-Josef Vogel, testified that TravelJun-
gle employs a "metasearch travel engine," which uses web robots or web
spiders to collect the necessary travel data from other websites.75 American
asserted that the robots or spiders employed by TravelJungle to sift through
AA.com used "valuable computer capacity," which American could no
longer utilize to serve its "legitimate customers."76 Vogel's testimony
seemed to lend support to American's contention when he admitted "there
might be a contact with the servers of American Airlines through that auto-
mated software program."77
How are Google's data-gathering activities any different from those of
TravelJungle? According to Vogel, TravelJungle, unlike Google, did not di-
rect its software to collect information at random times. 78 This statement
seems to imply that TravelJungle did direct its software to collect informa-
tion at specific times - namely, in response to a customer's specific inquiry.79
We are left to presume that Google, on the other hand, directs its software to
72. Id. at 297 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. TravelJungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 212 S.W.3d 841, 849-850 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.).
75. Id. at 849.
76. Id. at 847.
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collect information at random. 80 But even so, do the robots and spiders em-
ployed in Google's randomized searches not use the valuable computer ca-
pacity of its targets' servers? Or is simply searching other websites at
random sufficient for Google to eschew the requisite purposefulness inherent
in a suit involving personal jurisdiction? Unfortunately, the dearth of prece-
dent in this area of the law precludes such an analysis at the present.
TravelJungle reinforces the application of basic International Shoe stan-
dards involving determinations of personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants arising from data-mining activities conducted over the Internet. The
TravelJungle court's return to a more traditional analysis, as embodied by
Inset, could either reflect: (1) our courts' general inability or refusal to fully
adapt to rapidly changing technology; or (2) a common-sense approach for
incorporating new wrinkles in the law to a settled body of jurisprudence.
Without new guidance from the Supreme Court, the sharply contrasting ap-
proaches of Zippo and Inset will probably continue to muddle the landscape
of personal jurisdiction in the Internet age.
80. See id.

